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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the district
court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ Section 78A-4-103(2)(e) and Utah Code Ann.§
78A-4-118(9). This is an appeal from an order of a Utah district court's ruling on the
constitutionality of a statute and ordinance in a criminal case where the charge is other
than a first degree felony or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 12, 2013, Sandy City Police Detective, Todd Davis, noticed
an ad placed in backpage.com in the Salt Lake City Escorts subsection of the
subsection of Salt Lake City Adult Entertainment. The ad stated in part, "I'm a hot
brunette ready to come over and have some hot fun. I'm the real deal. No fake
pies. No upsale no games. Call me once and I'll have you hooked." The ad
included a phone number and partially nude pictures of a female, later identified as
the defendant. Detective Davis sent a text message to the number listed on the ad
and arranged to meet the defendant later that afternoon at a hotel room in Sandy
for a fee of $200 for an hour. The defendant went to the room at the agreed upon
time and accepted the $200 payment. After some discussion regarding what
services she would provide, the defendant was cited for doing business as an
escort in Sandy City without a Sexually Oriented business license in violation of
Sandy City Ordinance§ 5-18-3, a class b misdemeanor.
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SUMMARYOFARGUMENT
The District court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Neither Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-41.5, nor Sandy City Ordinance§ 5-18-3 violate
the Defendant's constitutional rights of freedom of speech or equal protection.
These regulations are content neutral because they regulate conduct and not
expression. As such, these regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny. The
appropriate standard for determining the constitutionality of these content neutral
regulations is the "incidental burden" test set forth by United States v. 0 'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, (1968). These regulations meet the four criteria for constitutionality
set forth by O'Brien. Further, the regulations do not violate the defendant's right
to equal protection because they are rationally related to the government's attempt
to minimize crime and health issues. Therefore, the Sandy City ordinance
requiring the defendant to obtain a Sexually Oriented Business license prior to
conducting business in the city of Sandy, and the statutory authorization for that
ordinance, do not violate the defendant's constitutional rights of free speech and
equal protection.

ARGUMENT
I.

N"EITHER THE UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-8-41.5, NOR SANDY CITY
ORDINANCE §5-18-3 ENACTED UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, VIOLATE
THE DEFENDANT'S FIRST _AMENDMENT RIGHT BECAUSE THE
REGULATION IS CONTENT NEUTRAL AND MEETS THE
REQUIREMENTS OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY.
A.

The rewlation imposed by Utah Statute and Sandv Ordinance is
content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny.

2

Generally, a "person employed in a sexually oriented business may not work in a
ri:mnicipality if the municipality requires that [person] be licensed individually and
if the person is not licensed by the municipality." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-841.5(2)(a)-(b) (West 2010). Further, "city councils of cities may ... make it
unlawful for any person to commit or offer to agree to commit an act of sexual
intercourse for hire, lewdness, or moral perversion within the city ... " Id. § 10-841 (1) (2012). Presently, "[it] shall be unlawful for any person to operate a sexually
oriented business in [Sandy] City without a valid sexually oriented business
license." Sandy City Ordinance Sect. 5-18-3, §12-2-4(a) (2004). For example,
nude dancing and adult novelty stores were categorized as sexually oriented
businesses, and so, were required to obtain sexually oriented business licenses. See

American Bush v. City of So. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah 2006);
Doctor John's, Inc. v. City ofRoy, 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006).
Where a regulation is content neutral the court should apply intermediate
scrutiny. A regulation restricting conduct is considered "content neutral" where
the content is not inherently expressive and ". . . should be treated as content
neutral if the regulations are neutral as to message." Buscho v. Utah State Tax

Comm 'n, 2009 UT 73, 225 P.3d 153, 160 (Utah 2009). "A regulation that
classifies as based on unprotected conduct by definition does not classify based on
protected expression and therefore is not content based." Id. Where the regulation
is "facially neutral" the court should conclude that the regulation is content neutral
absent evidence that the regulation was enacted with the intent of suppressing
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protected speech. Id. at 162. The Supreme Court has ruled that "intermediate
scrutiny'' is to be applied to regulations that attempt to limit speech in a·"contentneutral" manner, including the restricting of sexually oriented businesses. See

Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440 (197 6); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). Further, municipalities may
regulate the harmful secondary effects of a sexually oriented business in a
"content-neutral" provided they meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.

See Id., 475 U.S. at 47 (1986). See also, Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT

26, ,r 35, 73 P.3d 334, 342 (Utah 2003) ("Licensing schemes are constitutional if
they are content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.").
Sandy City's requirement the Defendant obtain a sexually oriented business
license before providing any escort services is content neutral. It is content neutral
on its face because it does not regulate the content of the message. Further, there is
no evidence presented that this regulation was passed with the intent of
suppressing protected expression. The regulation requires the defendant to obtain a
license before engaging in the escort business within the city limits. It does not
dictate the content of the message and is therefore "content neutral." Therefore,
any burden placed upon the defendant's freedom of speech is strictly incidental.
The regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it is "content neutral."

B.

The regulation at issue meets the requirements of the O 'Brien test for
intermediate scrutinv.
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The appropriate test to apply in the instant case is the "incidental burdens" test
set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, (1968). There are two tests
established by the courts for applying intermediate scrutiny to content neutral
regulations. The frrst is the "secondary effects" test. This test is applied when "the
regulation at issue is content based, i.e. is directed at speech rather than conduct,
but is justified with reference to the secondary effects associated with the speech
rather than the communicative content of the speech." See, Bushco v. Utah State

Tax Comm 'n, 2009 UT 73,225 P.3d 153, 164 (Utah 2009). The second test, is the
0 'Brien test. This test "applies to regulations that are content neutral both on their
face and as to purpose. This test is directed at determining whether a "sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating [conduct] can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment Freedoms." /d.(Citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
In the instant case, the requirement that the defendant obtain a Sexually Oriented
Business License is content neutral. It is directed toward conduct and not at speech
or the communicative content of speech. The regulation is facially neutral as to
content and there is not evidence that it was passed with the purpose of restricting
content. Any regulation of her speech therefore is only incidental to the regulation
of this conduct. Therefore, the applicable test is the O 'Brien test. 1

1

It should be noted that while the "secondary effects" test is not applicable in the

instant case, the case law applying the "secondary effects" cited herein is of value

5

"Under O'Brien, a regulation of conduct is constitutional and must
be upheld so long as: (1) it is within the power of the legislature to enact; (2) it
furthers a substantial government interest; (3) the gove~ent interest is unrelated
to the suppression of protected expression; and (4) any incidental restrictions it
imposes on protected expression are not greater than is essential to further the
interest." Id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). 2
In regard to the first prong of the O 'Brien test, the defendant does not
allege that it is not within the power of the correspondin.g legislative body to adopt
the statute or the Sandy ordinance authorized by the statute. The defendant argues
the Sandy ordinance does not meet the second, third and fourth prongs of O 'Brien
because the defendant is required by every municipality she wishes to conduct
business in.
In regard to the second prong, the case law regarding secondary effects is
helpful because the courts have recognized that "it is well established that
combating the secondary effects of adult businesses is a 'significant governmental
interest."' Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Roy, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (10 th Cir.
20014) (citing City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50) For example, when a city required
that a sexually oriented business be located within a certain zone, the court found
in determio.mg whether a statute is content neutral and providing authority
regarding the elements of the O 'Brien as discussed below.

2

See Appellant's Addendum "D." Third District Court, Order Denying Motion to
Dismiss, Dated July 17, 2014.
6

the regulations were "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech." City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v.

Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (See also:
Doctor John's Inc. v. City of Roy, 333 F.Supp. 2d 1168 (10 th Cir. 2004), ajf'd, 465
F .3d 1150 (10 th Cir. 2006), (holding that a zoning regulation against an adult
novelty store was constitutional); American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140
P .3d 123 5 (Utah 2006) (holding that a zoning regulation against an adult theater
was constitutional)). In the instant case, the Sandy Ordinance is directed toward
the harmful secondary effects that generally arise from a sexually oriented
business, similar to the harmful effects found to result from an Adult novelty store
and an Adult theater, such as crime and health issues, rather than banning the
provider's actual conduct. See Sandy City Ordinance #4-049, § 12-2-4(a) (2004);

Doctor John's Inc., 333 F.Supp. 2d 1168 (10 th Cir. 2004), ajf'd, 465 F.3d 1150
(10 th Cir. 2006); American Bush, 140 P.3d 1235.

In regard to the third prong, the governmental interest, as discussed above,
of registering Sexually Oriented Business workers is unrelated to the suppression
of protected expression. The ordinance does not place any restriction upon the
message or content of the licensed worker. It simply requires that the sexually
oriented business worker obtain a license. As discussed above, any impact on the
protected speech is strictly incidental because the ordinance does not regulate the
content of the speech or its message.

7

Addressing prong four of O'Brien, the Sandy ordinance does not place any
incidental restrictions on protected expression greater than are essential to further
governmental interest. The content of the defendant's speech is not being
regulated in any way. The city of Sandy simply requires the defendant obtain a
license before engaging in business within its city limits. The defendant argues
that Sandy should recognize the defendant's license in Midvale because it would
be less restrictive upon the defendant. This argument appears to apply the "least
restrictive means" test to the ordinance. The requirement established by O'Brien
and subsequent rulings is that the "governmental interest would "be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation." Bushco v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2009 UT 73,
225 P.3d 153, 168 (Utah 2009). The city's significant governmental interest in
regulating sexually oriented businesses cannot be accomplished by relying upon
surrounding jurisdictions because there is no higher authority to monitor or require
municipalities adhere to uniform standards and enforcement. Further, it is not
practical to require coordination between these municipalities. The regulatory
authority has been given directly to the cities with no other higher authority
available for coordinating the regulation. There is no statutory authority or case
law that would impose this requirement on the city. 3 The Sandy Ordinance is
designed .to allow promote its interest of promoting the safety and health of its
citizens. The Sandy ordinance places a simple requirement upon the defendant that

3

See Appellant's Addendum "D." Third District Court, Order Denying Motion to
Dismiss, Dated July 17, 2014.
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she obtain a license in order to promote its substantial governmental interest. That
interest would be achieved less effectively absent this regulation. As such, the
Sandy ordinance meets the fourth prong of O'Brien.
In conclusion, the Defendant's freedom of speech is not constitutionally
infringed upon. Sandy City's requirement the Defendant obtain a sexually oriented
business license before the Defendant provide any escort services within the City's
jurisdiction is constitutional because the ordinance is "content-neutral," within the
power of the legislature to enact; furthers the substantial government interest of
minimizing the criminal and health risks in the co111111unity, is unrelated to the
suppression of protected expression and imposes no restrictions upon protected
expression that are greater than is essential to further the interest.

IL THE DEFENDANT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RlGHTS WERE NOT
VIOLATED BECAUSE THE ORDINANCE IS RATIONALLY RELATED
TO THE CITY'S ATTEMPT TO MIN1MIZE CRIME AND HEALTH
CONCERNS
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
that 'no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."' City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985). Generally, legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. Id. Under the rational basis test, which gives great deference to the
governmental body that created the law, the burden of proof is on the challenger to
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show that the government's means are not rationally related to legitimate ends. See

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).

In support of her argument, the Defendant reiterates her argument regarding
prong four O 'Brian above as additional argument that the state has violated her
right to equal protection by giving the authority to Sandy City to pass a law
requiring only those in her profession to obtain licenses in multiple jurisdictions.
There is no authority supporting the idea that Sandy City should be required to
coordinate its licensu.re efforts with other municipalities or to rely upon their
licenses. Contrary to applicable law, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress
mistakenly references certain businesses that do not fit within the sexually
oriented businesses classifications and so do not require this type of licensing from
the City. These cases also deal with licensing requirements where there already
exists a higher licensing authority at the state level. See Consolidation Coal Co. v.

Emery County, 702 P .2d 121 (Utah 1985) (general business licensing); Davis v.
Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616 (Utah 1950) (licensing for attorneys).

In the instant case, the defendant has not met her burden in showing that
her right to equal protection has been violated. The defendant has not provided any
evidence that this right has been violated. The requirement that the defendant
acquire a license to conduct business as an escort is rationally related to the
legitimate interest discussed above of addressing concerns of public safety and
health. In conclusion, the Defendant's equal protection violation argument should
be dismissed because the Defendant failed to meet their burden of proof. Further,
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there has been not argument, nor evidence provided, that the defendant is a
member of a protected class. Therefore, where there is a rational basis for the
statute and ordinance, there has been no violation of the defendant's right to equal
protection.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41.5 and Sandy City
Ordinance Sect. 5-18-3, Sandy City has the jurisdictional authority to require the
Defendant to obtain a business license before conducting sexually oriented
business activities in the municipality. Sandy City's requirement that a sexually
oriented business license be obtained before the Defendant offer any escort
services within the City's jurisdiction is constitutional. This is because the
"content-neutral" ordinance in question. The ordinance in no way limits, or even
addresses, an escort's freedom of speech. Any impact on the defendant's first
amendment right is an "incidental burden." The regulation meets the O'Brien test.
Sandy City and the state legislature granting Sandy the authority to pass its
ordinance were acting within their legislative authority. The regulation furthers the
substantial governmental interest of addressing criminal and health concerns
involved in sexually oriented businesses. The governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of protected expression because it does not regulate speech and
only requires escorts to obtain a license. Any incidental restrictions the regulation
imposes on protected speech are only incidental because they are no greater than
essential to further the governmental interest. Finally, the ordinance is reasonably
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related to the governmental interest and does not violate the defendant's right to
equal protection. For the foregoing reasons, the appellee respectfully requests this
Court affirm the District Court's ruling denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.

51
Dated this~day of July, 2015

City Prosecutor
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